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ABSTRACT
Taiwan initiated a large infrastructure development program in 1991. Because
Taiwanese construction companies were small in size and lacked technology at
that time, they were not able to perform many projects. As a result, many
international contractors came to Taiwan, and formed alliances with local
companies.
While firms can achieve selective benefits through alliances, they may also lose
their competitive advantages in the process, which may be disadvantageous in
the long run. In order to ensure that forming alliances is strategically favorable
for overall profitability, a construction firm should first identify the profit items
of a project. It can then investigate the effects of an alliance on these profit
items through market structure analysis. Finally, by applying the iso-profit
model, which is developed in this thesis, the firm can bargain with its partner
to establish profitable cooperation.
The government has the authority to promote alliances through two policies: to
reinforce alliances though regulations, as well as to enhance profits from
alliances. Ultimately, in order to cure its past flaws in policy, the Taiwanese
government should motivate alliances in the construction industry.
Thesis Supervisor: Charles H. Helliwell Jr.
Title: Senior Lecturer, Center for Construction Research and Education
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I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation of Research
Although Taiwan has been classified as a newly industrialized
country, its infrastructure is still insufficient in many aspects. The
government thus initiated a large infrastructure development program in
1991, called "Six-Year National Development Plan." Many construction
projects in this program involve large amount of money, high degree of
complexity, and very advanced technologies that not a single Taiwanese
construction company can afford. On the other hand, because of
government regulation and the lack of access to local construction
resources (including manpower, machines, and materials'), foreign
companies cannot join bids in this program on their own. As a result,
there are many alliances in Taiwan's construction industry in recent
years, including many international cooperations among Taiwanese
construction companies and foreign contractors.
This situation is particularly interesting because of several
reasons. First, there is no analytical tool for construction firms in Taiwan
to judge the profitability in alliances. Forming alliances may be currently
favorable because it helps both local and foreign construction companies
to participate in the big program and earn profit from it. However, this is
not always a profitable strategy in the long run, since parties in alliances
may lose their competitive advantages. For Taiwanese companies, losing
local market share and control can be tremendous disadvantages. From
the perspective of foreign companies, loss of their proprietary ownership
of well-developed technologies can also be disadvantageous in the future.
Therefore, these construction companies need a logical method to solve
Halpin, Daniel W. and Woodhead, Ronald W. 1985. Construction Management, p.10-11.
the strategic dilemma - whether forming alliances is a profitable choice
for firms, both in short term and long term.
Second, the Taiwanese government did not impose a clear
industrial policy on the construction industry. Unlike other strategic
industries such as steel, electronics, and petrochemicals, for which
successful industrial policies have been devised and implemented 2, the
government did not use policy aggressively to help Taiwanese
construction firms build competitiveness. Consequently, Taiwanese
construction companies cannot compete with foreign companies. Under
the trend of free and open markets in today's world, the government is
now struggling to control the market share of foreign companies and at
the same time assist local companies in acquiring competitiveness. In
this circumstance, how should construction industrial policy be made to
regulate alliances? What effect will this policy have on the profitability of
local and foreign construction companies? The government and
construction companies in Taiwan should be able to answer these
questions before they plan their future operation.
Third, a situation similar to that in Taiwan can also be applied to
many developing countries. For these countries, an understanding of
today's construction industry in Taiwan will be a useful reference for
solving their similar problems. For international contractors, the
experience in Taiwan can also provide an analogue when they attempt to
enter markets in these developing countries.
This thesis will address these interesting questions regarding
international alliances in Taiwan's construction industry, and try to
develop an analytic method to seek answers to them.
2 Arnold, Walter. 1989. "Bureaucratic Policies, State Capacity, and Taiwan's Automobile Industrial
Policy," Modern China. Vol.15 No.2, April 1989. p. 1 8 0 .
1.2 Research Goal, Scope, and Method
1.2.1 Research Goal
The goal of this research is to develop a systemic method to
analyze the profit distribution of the firms in alliances. Through the
analysis of Taiwan's situation based on this method, the writer will
recommend some strategies for the firms and a policy proposal for the
government.
1.2.2 Scope of Research
The whole construction industry covers a wide range, including
such sectors as private residential and office buildings, private industrial
construction, public residential and office buildings, and public
infrastructure construction. Each sector has a different level of freedom
in choosing a contracting method, and each requires a different level of
technology. This can be represented in the framework in Exhibit 1.1. The
whole industry is too large and broad to be included in this research.
Thus this thesis will focus on the projects of public infrastructure
construction, that is, the projects funded by the government, excluding
residential and office buildings. The are two reasons for choosing this
market sector. First, unlike the private sector, the Taiwanese government
can use only low price bids form of contract award. Thus the analysis
can be simplified by eliminating the need to consider the many
implications of different contracting methods. Second, the technology
involved in this sector is more complex than that in the sectors of
residential and office buildings, and thus is a key factor which affects
profit of firms.
Low
Technology
Requirement
High
Freedom in Choosing Contracting Method
Low High
Public Private
Residential and Office Buildings Residential and Office Buildings
Public Private
Infrastructure Construction Industrial Construction
Exhibit 1.1 Framework of Construction Market Segmentation
Alliances can occur in many stages of a construction project.
Because of the market sector chosen in this research, the main analysis
will focus on the construction stage, and primary on international
alliances formed by a local construction company and a foreign
contractor. However, an overview of different types of alliances in the
construction industry is provided in this thesis.
1.2.3 Research Method and Procedure
The method of this research contains two major parts: literature
review for concepts of alliances; and, economic profit analysis of
construction firms.
The main analysis of this research first defines an overall profit
model for a construction firm. Based on this profit model, the thesis then
investigates how alliances alter the market forces in terms of the overall
profit, and how policy will affect the decision of firms in alliances. The
research procedure is shown in Exhibit 1.2.
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Collect Literature Collect Data forThesis Formulation
Review Literature
Define Methodology
Reasoning Process
Conduct Analysis
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K
Exhibit 1.2 Research Procedure
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1.3 Structure of Thesis
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 provides an
overview of the thesis, with a description of motivation, goal, scope, and
method of research. Chapter 2 gives general ideas about strategic
alliances. It summarizes some important points in the literature about
alliances, and explains different types of alliances in the construction
industry. Chapter 3 introduces the construction industry in Taiwan by
identifying the problems in this industry and how alliances can help with
those problems. Chapter 4 first analyzes the profit of construction firms.
Based on this analysis, the writer then investigates how alliances will
affect the profit of construction firms. In the last part of this chapter, a
model about how firms should make decisions in forming international
alliances is developed. In Chapter 5, the power of the government and its
policy on alliances is examined. Finally, Chapter 6 draws conclusions
from previous chapters and make some recommendations for
construction firms and the government in Taiwan.
II. The Concept of Alliances
2.1 Strategic Alliances in Literature
2.1.1 Definition of Strategic Alliances
A strategic alliance is an agreement between two or more
companies to work together to achieve an objective. The agreement
leading to a strategic alliance needs not follow a legal or organizational
form: it can take the form of a handshake agreement, licensing, mergers,
or a joint venture.3 A strategic alliance can be formed with a supplier, a
customer, a complementary firm, a competitor, or a facilitator such as
government or academia. The key notion of a strategic alliance is that it
leverages the distinctive competitive advantage of one firm with those of
the partners. Since the major factor that prevents many firms from
achieving their operational goals is lack of resources, the strategic
alliance can be a good way to put resources together, such as technology
and capital, in order to make a breakthrough.
2.1.2 Motivations for Alliances
Firms form strategic alliances for different purposes. Therefore, it
is important to identify the goals for parties in alliances. Lorange and
Roos have suggested the generic motives for strategic alliances. 4 There
are two dimensions in this framework. One is the strategic importance
and the strategic fits within a firm's overall portfolio of the particular
business for which the strategic alliance has been formed. In this
3 Chen, Pen S. and Heide, Dorothy. 1993. "Strategic Alliances in Technology: Key Competitive Weapon,"
SAMAdvanced Management Journal, Vol 58 No.4, Autumn 1993. p. 9 -17 .
4 Lorange, Peter and Roos, Johan. 1992. Strategic Alliances - Formation, Implementation, and Evolution.
p.6-10.
dimension the business can be classified into two categories: core
business and peripheral business. The other dimension concerns a firm's
relative position in its particular business segment, that is, whether or
not the firm is a leader or a follower.
Within these two dimensions, four generic motives for strategic
alliances can be defined: defending, remaining, catching up, or
restructuring, as shown in Exhibit 2.1.
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Exhibit 2.1 Framework of Generic Motives for Strategic Alliances
SOURCE: Loranae & Roos. Strateaic Alliances
1. Defending
When a firm enjoys relative leadership in a particular business
that is core within its overall portfolio, usually the motive of forming
strategic alliances is defending. There are two rationales for this motive.
Caesch upre
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The first rationale is access to markets and/or technology. Defensively
oriented alliances can help leader firms keep track of new technologies in
their core business or seek new business opportunities. In this case they
can ally with new, entrepreneurial, embryonic organizations to refresh
the technological skills that may be necessary to get into a new market
segment for this core business.
The second rationale is securing resources. Firms in this situation
sometimes form strategic alliances for securing raw materials or
inexpensive products. This is more often the case for multinational firms
in developing countries.
2. Remaining
If the particular business is peripheral for a firm but one in which
the firm is a leader, the strategic motive for alliances is to remain. The
concept of remaining is that the firm should maximize efficiency while
reducing the resource requirement for this business so that it can
preserve the leadership position but shift more resources to its core
business.
Another case of remaining is in multinational business, where
firms seek continuous presence in foreign countries. In this case, to
contribute to its overall global business, a multinational company can
ally with a local partner and gain access to the particular market at the
cost of giving up full ownership and control. Alliances for this purpose
are often project-based joint ventures.
3. Catching up
When a firm is a follower in its core business, its primary motive
for partnering should be to catch up. The firm should establish its
strength in this core business to gain competitive advantages and seek
industrial leadership within alliances through absorbing technology from
partners or outsourcing the peripheral tasks. When catching up is the
motive of an alliance, however, the firm may lose its volition because of
sharing control over strategy and decision making.
4. Restructuring
If a firm has a peripheral business in which it is a follower, it can
form strategic alliances for restructuring the business -- either trying to
build strength to become a leader or seeking the chance to unload this
business by shifting it to partners.
2.1.3 Benefits from Alliances
The combination of the resource and expertise of partners can
greatly benefit a company. There are the following nine major benefits
that firms can seek from alliances:
1. Leverage internal investments
Managers are always faced with the problem of limited resource
allocations. There will be fewer competing interests within the firm
contending for a share of finite corporate resources if partners in an
alliance can provide certain required upstream products or services to
each other, enlarging the effect of internal investment within the alliance.
2. Deal with core competencies
There are two ways the strategic alliances can help companies to
deal with core competencies. The first way is to re-focus on a company's
core competencies. By deciding what skills and process a company
should have mastered, it can then form partnerships and acquire
everything else from partners. The second way is to leverage the core
competencies of others in an alliance. Achieving economies of scale by
increasing the utilization factors of partners can maximize the use of
their core competencies, and thus benefit each other.
3. Reduce operating costs
Management expense and overhead is a significant part of a
company's cost. Strategic alliances provide a good opportunity to
combine the activities of companies, and give them the ability to reduce
operating staffs while still being able to maintain the same level of
functional performance.
4. Broaden product or service offerings
In a strategic alliance, firms can jointly introduce their different
products or services to the market. In this case value has been added by
expanding the range of services or products.
5. Gain flexibility for changing markets
Joining forces with different organizations offers a firm the
opportunity to increase organizational capability for responding to
changing demands from the market. The flexibility is present in two
ways: capacity for changing work loads, or the capabilities for dealing
with variations in service requirements.
6. Spread risk
Strategic alliances reduce operating errors by allowing each
partner to focus on its own specialty, thus reducing the risk of failure.
Even in the event of a failure, the partners share the consequences and
costs so that the damages are less severe than they would be for a single
company.
7. Improve quality
By combining the efforts with selected providers in a long-term
commitment and with a mutual reliance on success, companies can
enhance and raise the standard of quality while still remaining at the
same level of cost.
8. Gain access to advanced technologies
Generally speaking, the partners in strategic alliances are selected
often because of their possession of superior competencies and advanced
technology in their area of expertise. Furthermore, it is expected that the
partners' competencies are the most advanced ones in their industries.
Strategic alliances provide a way to access and absorb the advanced
technologies of partners. This is often one of the most important reasons
for entering a strategic alliance.
9. Penetration into foreign market
In the case where a company is to expand its business into a
foreign market, an alliance with a local company is a beneficial strategy.
With this alliance, the company can acquire business know-how in a
foreign country. Furthermore, in the case when there are barriers set by
the government, strategic alliances might be the only low-cost way to
enter the market.
2.1.4 Risks in Alliances
Before entering an alliance, there are also potential risks a firm
should take into consideration. The following summarizes the three most
significant risks in an alliance.
1. Protection of core competencies
For a company, the core competencies are the most important
features which provide most of the value to customers. Though the core
competencies are not easy to imitate over the short term, long-term
partnership provides enough time to obtain insights for emulating special
competencies. While some companies enter alliances to gain access to a
partner's competencies, these partners should be aware of this intention
and protect their own competencies. This is also a significant conflict
point within strategic alliances.
2. Mismatch between partners
Companies in strategic alliances always have differences in
corporate culture, organizational structure, decision making procedures
and business objectives. These differences may break the alliance.
Sometimes the strategic objectives between partners diverge in totally
different directions. In this case, instead of bringing benefit to partners,
the alliance becomes a burden for them.
3. Shared control
An inherent feature of strategic alliances is the need for sharing
decision making authority. Also, it is difficult to react to the operational
change within an alliance because each partner has to give up its
autonomy to some extent.
2.1.5 Key Factors to Success
1. Partner Selection
The selection of partners is always one of the most important key
factors determining the success of an alliance. However, this is not a
trivial task. When considering potential partners to form alliances with,
there are five issues which should be evaluated.
The first consideration is historical and projected performance. The
basic criteria of selecting partners is the performance of these potential
partners. It is necessary to consider a company's past record on profit,
financial structure, market share, and reputation, and then predict and
evaluate the performance in the future.
The second is the possession of key technologies and resources.
One of the most important reasons for a firm to enter into a cooperative
arrangement is to compensate for missing skills, competencies, and
resources. More importantly, the task of establishing core competencies
for a company often requires some advanced technologies which do not
exist in that company. Alliances provide a way to learn, but first the firm
should decide what to learn, and then find who owns the technologies.
When considering resources and skills, it may be critical to look at the
potential partner's technological prowess, innovativeness, access to
specific skills and resources, government connections, distribution
channels, and production lines.
The third consideration is the compatibility between companies.
The organizational structures, cultures, objectives, and management
processes are different from company to company. If companies in an
alliance are not compatible in these areas, it is obvious that difficulty in
communication and decision making will arise, and that the failure of the
alliance might be expected.
The forth consideration is the relationship between potential
partners. The relationship in the past between partners is an important
factor in an alliance. It is reasonable to consider the past interactions,
common customers and technologies, and the level of mutual trust
between the company and its potential partners.
Finally, the expectation of alliance should also be considered.
There are two aspects of this issue. One is the strategic importance of
alliance for the company. This depends on the purpose of entering the
alliance. For example, an alliance for entering a new market may not be
as important as an alliance for acquiring technology to establish core
competencies. On the other hand, the purposes of the potential partners
for entering the alliance should also be taken into consideration. After
understanding their purposes, companies can then evaluate the potential
benefits (such as reduced cost), and the potential risks (such as lost of
core competencies).
2. Complexity of Organization and Task
Complexity is also an important factor for success of strategic
alliances. When forming strategic alliances, there are two types of
complexity that should be taken into consideration: task complexity and
organizational complexity.
Task complexity depends on three main factors: scope of alliance
activities, environment uncertainty, and relevant partner resources and
skills. Organizational complexity depends on the frequency and nature of
interactions between partners, which are further affected by the number
of partners, role of each partner, level of trust, and task complexity.
Research done by Killing indicated that three factors should be
taken into consideration by a firm when entering a strategic alliance. 5
First of all, alliances that are working on a complex task need not be
complex in organization. Task is not the only factor which decides the
complexity of organization. Secondly, firms should start with the simpler
alliances of less complex task and organization to establish a degree of
mutual trust before the formation of complex alliances. Finally, weak
firms should be wary of forming complex alliances with strong firms to
avoid losing competencies in the alliance.
3. Appropriate Management
Alliances can be successful and effective only through adopting
appropriate management. Chen and Heide suggested four important
management issues that firms should work on to ensure the success of
alliances. 6
The first issue is to establish management style. The alliance is
collegial rather than hierarchical, and parties will have strong
interdependence. In this situation, due to the differences between firms
in culture and objectives, a new style of management has to be
5 Killing, J. Peter, 1988. "Understanding Alliances: The Role of Task and Organization Complexity," in
Contractor, Farok J. and Lorange, Peter eds., Cooperative Strategies in International Business. p.55-67.
6 Chen, Pen S. and Heide, Dorothy, 1993. "Strategic Alliances in Technology: Key Competitive Weapon,"
SAM Advanced Management Journal, Vol 58 No.4, Autumn 1993. p.9 -17.
established to nurture the network of contacts, form mutual trust, and
release constrains within the alliance.
The second management issue is about defining core technology to
protect competitive advantages. The managers in an alliance must fully
realize what can be shared with other companies and what is not
appropriate. The critical technologies should be developed and shared,
but the core technologies of the companies where each manager came
from should remain separate. Otherwise, entering alliances cannot bring
benefit but reduce the competitive advantages of a company.
Third, firms should set milestones and checkpoints. Alliances
should be established step by step. Frequently reviewing what has been
done is the key to success in alliances. Thus the milestones and
checkpoints should be set before the task, and the review work should be
fully executed to ensure the procedure is without fault.
The final issue is to manage conflict constructively. It is inevitable
that there will be conflict between partners in a strategic alliance.
Managing conflict constructively through examining alternative
viewpoints can create new ideas and better approaches, and even
increase cohesiveness after solving the problem.
2.2 Strategic Alliances in the Construction Industry
2.2.1 The Process and Actors in the Construction Industry
The production process in the construction industry is a complex
and large-scaled procedure which involves several tasks and actors.
According to the framework of total-life building process as defined by
Halpin and Woodhead, the total production process includes project
formulation, planning, engineering-design, construction, use
management, and disposal. 7 The actors involved in the process include
owners, planning consultants, A/E design consultants, construction
management consultants, contractors (including general contractors and
subcontractors), material suppliers, machine suppliers, financial
institutions, and facility operators. Exhibit 2.2 demonstrates the total-life
building process and the actors involved.
In many other industries, a company can perform more than one
role in the life cycle of its product. In the computer industry, for example,
IBM is not only a manufacturer of computer hardware and accessories.
Its designing, producing, and marketing OS/2 is identical to the
business of a software company. A similar situation also exists in the
construction industry. A company in the construction industry may not
act in only one role in the building process. Some companies may have
both design and construction divisions. There are also cases where a
company which is usually a general contractor owns construction
material factories, such as cement mixing plants, and sells the material
to other contractors.
In this thesis, a construction company is referred to as the
company which actually executes the construction process, either as a
general contractor or a subcontractor, while such company may still be
able to perform other tasks in the total-life building process.
2.2.2 Types of Alliances
Because of the complexity of the construction process, actors may
benefit each other through cooperations in which they can combine
efforts to deal with difficulties in the process. Therefore firms in the
construction industry may ally together involuntarily. There are two
7 Halpin, Daniel W. and Woodhead, Ronald W. 1985. Construction Management, p.2-7.
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important types of alliances which are usually formed by firms
automatically. The first type is construction alliances among contractors,
sometimes called joint ventures. All contractors involved in construction
alliances can combine construction specialties, pool capital and
resources, and share construction risks. The second type is the alliances
between a contractor and a material supplier, in which the contractor
can obtain a steady material supply at a lower cost, while the supplier
has constant purchase orders and shares the profit from construction
with contractors.
Sometimes an owner will choose a contracting method which
requires different actors to perform as a team. In this case different
actors have to organize alliances in order to participate in construction
projects. Three construction contracting methods, in terms of
organization, require team work of actors.8 The first is design-build
contracting, which requires cooperation between A/E designers and
contractors. The second is turnkey contracting, in which a turnkey team
of A/E designers, contractors, and financial institutions is established.
The third method is Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracting. A BOT
team consists of A/E designers, constructors, financial institutions, and
facility operators.
Even when the contracting method does not require cooperation,
firms can still benefit by forming alliances. For example, the designers
and contractors can form alliances without being obligated to do so.
Designers can create better designs and estimates by consulting with
contractors and understanding the technology constraints in
construction. Contractors can also be better off with better
' Gordon, Christopher M. 1994, "Choosing Appropriate Construction Contracting Method," Journal of
Construction Engineering and Management. Vol. 120 No. 1, March 1994. p. 19 6 -19 8 .
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understanding of design so that they can fulfill construction
specifications more easily.
Finally, even owners can join alliances with other actors. A joint
development plan which integrates the efforts of all the actors in the
building process can save a large portion of contingency cost and reduce
conflicts between actors.
Exhibit 2.3 summarizes different types of strategic alliances in the
construction industry, and the actors involved in each type.
Alliance Type Required byContracting Method Major Participants
1 Construction Alliances General Contractors
(Joint Ventures)
2 Contractor-Supplier Integrations General Contractors
Material Suppliers
3 Design-Build Teams Design-Build Contract A/E Designers
General Contractors
4 Turnkey Teams Turnkey Contract A/ E Designers
General Contractors
Financial Institutions
5 BOT Teams Build-Operate-Transfer A/E Designers
Contract General Contractors
Financial Institutions
Facility Operators
6 Joint Development Teams Joint Development Plan Owners
Planning Consultants
A/E Designers
General Contractors
Construction Managers
Financial Institutions
Exhibit 2.3 Strategic Alliances in the Construction Industry
III. Taiwan's Construction Industry
3.1 An Overview of Taiwan's Construction Industry
3.1.1 The Importance of Construction Industry to Taiwan
The construction industry has always been one of the most
important industries in all countries around the world. That is because
the infrastructure of a nation consists of the products of the construction
industry. These products include buildings, manufacturing factories,
transportation systems, power plants, dams, industrial and petroleum
facilities, and many other structures, which largely determine the
capacity of many other industries in the national economy to produce
and distribute goods and services. 9 Some of these products, such as
sewerage systems and recycling facilities, also affect the living standard
of a nation. In recent years, the worldwide construction industry has
generated a total value of over $3.2 trillion construction work annually,
which is about 6.5% of the world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In the
U.S., the construction and related industries contribute 10% to 12% to
the GDP, and employ more than 5.6 million workers. 10 The importance of
the construction industry is demonstrated by the above statistics.
In Taiwan, the output of the construction industry accounts for 4%
to 6% of the Gross National Product (GNP). Exhibit 3.1 shows the
percentage of the construction industry in the GNP. The major products
of the construction industry include residential buildings, non-
residential buildings, and other constructions, which also contribute
about half of the nation's Gross Fixed Capital Formation, as shown in
9 Lin. Ming-Hung. 1995. Processes and Effective Analytical Tools for Strategic Planning in the
Construction Industry, Master Thesis, MIT. p. 16.
10 Construction Review. 1994.
Exhibit 3.2.11 The construction industry is a key factor in Taiwan's
economic growth because it is the fundamental element for other
industries. In addition, because of the industrial linkage effect, many
other industries will be promoted by the prosperous construction
industry. 12 Furthermore, the growth in the construction industry will
increase the rate of employment significantly, which helps boost the
nation's economy. Consequently, the construction industry is often
refereed to as the "locomotive industry" in Taiwan.
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Exhibit 3.1 Construction in Taiwan's GNP
Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1994
1 Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1994. p.41-56.
12 Chang, Chen-Yu. 1994. A Research on the Economic Behavior of the Construction Market in the R. O. C.
Master Thesis, National Taiwan University. p.66. In Chinese.
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Exhibit 3.2 Contribution of Construction in the Gross Fixed
Capital Formation in Taiwan
Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1994
3.1.2 Six-Year National Development Plan
In 1990, the Council for Economic Planning and Development in
Taiwan proposed the "Six-Year National Development Plan," a large-
scaled infrastructure development program to be performed during the
years of 1991 to 1996. The Executive Yuan (Cabinet) approved this
program in January, 1991, and started its execution. The goals of this
program are to restore economy order and to reach balanced overall
progress, through raising the per capita income, establishing industrial
capacity, balancing the development in each area, and promoting living
standards.13 There are fourteen major categories of development in this
program, including agriculture, water systems, transportation and
communication, urban and housing, energy, education, industrial
development, environment protection, medical services, social security,
and other items. The range of this program is very wide, and many
construction projects are involved in each category of development.
The total planned spending of this program is NT$82.8 trillion
(about US$3 trillion), in which there is about NT$32.8 trillion directly
spent in construction projects. This means that the government planned
an annual investment of NT$5,500 billion in the construction industry
during these six years. 14 Consequently, the whole construction industry
in Taiwan was stimulated by this program. Many international
contractors also noticed this great opportunity and wanted to participate
and benefit.
Compared with construction projects in the past development
programs in Taiwan, including those in the "Ten Major Projects" started
in 1973 which was the largest government investment in construction
projects before 1990, the construction projects in the Six-Year National
Development Plan have two different characteristics. These two
characteristics become the main challenge for Taiwanese construction
firms to participate in this program. First, the cost of each projects is
much higher. Firms therefore need a larger capacity in capital as well as
other company resources to deal with these larger projects. Second, the
technology requirement is higher. This is because many new types of
13 Six- Year National Development Plan. 1991. Council of Economic Planning and Development, Executive
Yuan, ROC. p. 1-3. In Chinese.
14 Lin, Ching-Nan. 1992. Research on the Joint Venture for Construction, Master Thesis, National Taiwan
Institute of Industrial Technology. p.25. In Chinese.
construction work are included, such as high speed railway, mass rapid
transit (MRT) system, and many other advanced industrial facilities.
These projects may involve new construction technology which
Taiwanese construction companies had never used, require higher
accuracy of engineering, or contain higher complexity which is difficult to
be managed by existing engineering and management technology.
3.2 Regulations in the Construction Industry
3.2.1 Classification of Construction Firms
The basic regulation for the construction industry in Taiwan is the
"Construction Industry Administration Rules," which is set by the
Ministry of Interior. According to this regulation, all construction
companies are divided into three classes: class A, class B, and class C.
This regulation applies to any kind of construction work, including
public construction, industrial construction, and residential building as
well. Exhibit 3.3 shows the requirements for registration and the
limitations for each class.
All companies should start from class C, and they can upgrade to
the next higher class after two years if they fulfill both capital and
experience requirements. Among these two main requirements for
upgrading, capital requirements are not substantial. Even for class A
companies, the capital requirement is still low (NT$2,250,000, about
US$850,000). Therefore, the experience requirement is a more critical
condition. Furthermore, the limitation of contract price imposed on firms
in class B and C make this condition more important. For example, for
class C firms, the price limitation is NT$15,000,000. To apply to be a
class B firm, a class C firm needs to finish projects with a total of
NT$75,000,000 within five years, which means at least five projects
should be done. Thus, upgrading is not an easy task for firms in class B
and class C because of this limitation.
Registration Requirement
Class Number of Limitation of
Minsmum Certified Awarded Contract
Registered Professional Experience Price
Capital Engineer
A NT$7,500,000 More than 1 1. In class B for more than 2 years No Limit
2. Finished total construction work
worth more than NT$50,000,000
within the past 5 years
1. In class C for more than 2 years
B NT$2,500,000 More than 1 No more than
NT$10,000,000
2. Finished total construction work for each contract
worth more than NT$25,000,000
within the past 5 years
No more than
C NT$1,000,000 More than 1 New companies. NT$5,000,000
for each contract
Exhibit 3.3 Regulation of Construction Firm Classification in
Taiwan
Source: Ministry of Interior, Republic of China, Construction Industry Administration Rules
Two implications can be concluded from this classification system.
The first implication is that this regulation limits the size of projects
which firms can work on, and thus limits the profitability of firms.
Because the mark-up of a project is usually a proportion of the total
price of the project, which is usually 10% to 15%, if the price of the
project is limited, the amount of profit will be limited as a result. For
instance, there is a construction firm which usually enjoys a 10%
markup of it work. That means if the firm works on a $1,000,000 project,
it has a profit of $100,000. However, if the company can only take the
projects with price less than $100,000, the profit from each job therefore
will be less than $10,000. Thus firms will try very hard to upgrade to
class A as soon as possible.
The second implication is that the classification system focuses on
only the capacity of firms. It has no specialty requirement. This is
different from the situation in Japan, where the regulation requires firms
to be specific on what kind of jobs they can take, such as tunnel,
highway, etc., so that firms cannot undertake different kind of jobs
before being qualified. This implication shows that a class A firm has
very high degree of freedom in getting work.
3.2.2 Pre-qualified Bidding System
Design and construction are separated in Taiwan's public
construction projects. After the design work is finished, the owner follows
a low-price bidding process for contract awarding. The basic regulation
related to the bidding process is an executive order called "Notice on
Construction Bidding for Executive Yuan and Subdivisions." It states
that only firms with sufficient experience, capacity, and equipment can
participate in the bidding of public construction work. The qualification
standards of each project can be set by the authorized government
engineering agency which is in charge of the project. These standards
include the following five items: 1. financial capacity, 2. past performance
and experience, 3. work plan for the project which is certified by
professional engineers, 4. availability of necessary machinery, and 5.
credit record. 15 The executive order lists some standards for general
qualification, but allows the authorized agency to change these
standards.
This order basically gives the authorized agencies much freedom in
using this bidding system. The agencies can just announce the
standards and all firms which meet the standard are qualified to bid. In
this case the bidding system is basically an open bidding system. On the
other hand, the agencies can also use pre-qualification aggressively.
According to this bidding process regulation, it is also lawful that the
agencies use the bidding system as a nominated bidding system in that
they examine the standards of the work plan (3rd item) and equipment
preparation (4th item) of firms which want to bid, and then nominate
qualified companies to participate in price bidding. In this case firms are
judged in terms of technology, because these two standard items
represents the technological proposal of a construction company.
Because many projects in the Six-Year National Development
Program are very large and complex, the authorized government
engineering agencies, such as the Department of National Highway
Construction and Taipei Department of Rapid Transit System, usually
use an aggressive pre-qualification process.
Pre-qualified bidding system puts three important constraints on
firms: financial capacity, past performance and experience, and
technology qualification. These constraints limit the type, number, and
price of construction projects that a construction firm can be awarded.
For example, in 1995, the Department of National Highway Construction
required the financial capacity to be twenty times the registered capital of
15 Executive Yuan, ROC. Executive order. Notice on Construction Bidding for Executive Yuan and
Subdivisions. Article 7 and 8.
a company.16 To be awarded a contract in highway construction, a
contractor should first have enough experience and technology. Even if a
firm is qualified on these conditions, it can only be awarded the total
value of projects (i.e. the sum of project prices) no more than twenty
times the registered capital of the company. If the company's registered
capital is $1,000,000, and it already has two awarded projects of which
the prices are $10,000,000 and $5,000,000, respectively, then this
company can participate in bidding only for the project of which the
estimated (design) price is less than $5,000,000 because the capital
capacity of this company is $20,000,000.
3.3 Construction Firms and Alliances in Taiwan
3.3.1 Local Construction Firms
1. Problems of Local Construction Companies
When Taiwanese construction companies are investigated, there
are two problems presented. First, the sizes of these construction firms
are too small. Exhibit 3.4 classifies the size of Taiwanese construction
companies in 1991, the year when the Six-Year National Development
Plan started. These figures show that even the largest Taiwanese
companies are relatively much smaller than big construction companies
in the U.S. and Japan. Until recently, the situation has only improved a
little. The figures for Taiwanese companies in 1995, as shown in Exhibit
3.5, demonstrate that most of the Taiwanese companies are still small in
terms of capital.
16 Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC. 1995. Operational Norms ofJV in Public Construction for Small &
Middle Size Entrepreneur, Appendix, p.IV-3. In Chinese.
Registered Capital Class A Class B Class C
More Than NT$500,000,000 6
NT$400,000,000 - NT$500,000,000 2
NT$300,000,000 - NT$400,000,000 1
NT$200,000,000 - NT$300,000,000 3
Less Than NT$200,000,000 1,064
Total Companies 1,076 519 1,443
Exhibit 3.4 Number of Construction Companies in Taiwan in 1992
Source: Ministryu of Interior, Republic of China
Registered Capital Class A Class B Class C
More Than NT$1,000,000,000 6
NT$400,000,000 - NT$1,000,000,000 12
NT$200,000,000 - NT$400,000,000 17
NT$100,000,000 - NT$200,000,000 122 1
NT$60,000,000 - NT$100,000,000 135
NT$20,000,000 - NT$60,000,000 889 47 20
NT$10,000,000 - NT$20,000,000 16 58 48
Less Than NT$10,000,000 241 709 2,496
Total Companies 1,438 814 2,565
Exhibit 3.5 Number of Construction Companies in Taiwan in 1995
Source: Construction Industrial Association, Taiwan Area
The second problem is the lack of technology, both in management
and construction. There are three aspects of this problem: low degree of
automation; insufficient experience and knowledge in a variety of project
types; and invalid management skills and technology. Although the
industry in Taiwan has already become aware of this problem and has
started to find solutions to it, most of the research projects in
construction technology development are supported by the government. 17
Taiwanese companies did not actually put much effort into the
development of technology.
In fact, these two problems are closely related. If firms remain
small, they will not have the ability to develop advanced technology to
save cost and increase profit. The lack of capital capacity limits firms'
qualification for big projects, so that firms have less chance to obtain
experience and improve technology, which only worsens the insufficiency
of technology.
These problems with Taiwanese construction companies affect the
competitiveness and profitability of firms. They also result in firms being
incapable of working on public construction projects. One significant
example is the case of the Taipei MRT projects. During the years of 1991
and 1992, there were not enough local companies qualified to participate
in these projects. Exhibit 3.6 illustrates this situation. Part of the
problem can be relieved if firms can increase their registered capital. The
rest of it can be solved only through the technology progress in other
domestic construction firms.
The problems become more harmful to Taiwanese firms because of
the internationalization of Taiwan's construction market. In 1992,
Taiwan applied for General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT),
which is now renamed as World Trade Organization (WTO), and started
to negotiate with other member countries in 1993.18 Many of the major
member countries suggested that Taiwan should join this international
organization as a developed country, and therefore the government could
not impose protectionism on the domestic market in the future. Since
17 Hsiao, Jen-Chi. 1995. A Comparison of Construction Automation in Major Constraints and Potential
Techniques for Automation in the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan. Master Thesis, MIT. p. 45-46.
18 Baum, Julian. 1993. "Waiting for the Call," Far Eastern Economic Review. March 23, 1993. p. 47.
then, Taiwan's construction market has been open to all contractors
around the world. In 1995, there were already 42 companies among the
top 225 international contractors which are now working in Taiwan. 19
With much larger capacity in capital and finance, and more advanced
management and construction skills, foreign companies are more
competitive than Taiwanese ones. This situation makes it even more
difficult for small Taiwanese firms with insufficient technology to survive
in the market.
Number of Number of AdditionalNumber ofBid Prices Bids Qualified Qualified Companies if their
Companies Capital Increased
NT$1,500,000,000-$2,500,000,000 7 12 6
NT$2,500,000,000-$4,000,000,000 7 9 4
More than $4,000,000,000 11 4 3
Exhibit 3.6 Bid Prices and Qualified Companies for Taipei MRT
Projects in 1991-1992
Source: Taipei Department of Rapid Transit System
2. Purposes of Forming Alliances for Local Firms
Faced with the problems mentioned previously, Taiwanese
construction companies have a primary operational objective of finding
solutions to them, in order to participate in the current giant national
projects, and to survive in future competition. Forming alliances is one of
the most effective strategies to achieve this objective. In general,
19 "Going Global - The Top International Contractors," Engineering News Record. August 28, 1995. p.92 .
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Taiwanese companies enter construction alliances mainly for four
purposes. First, companies can leverage capital and other resources
through alliances. That is particularly important because the amount of
money involved in the recent public construction projects is much larger
than before. Small companies need to pool capital together so that they
can fulfill the capacity qualification.
Second, Taiwanese construction firms can establish technological
competencies through alliances. They can ally with foreign companies
and absorb their technologies directly, or they may combine their efforts
on research and development, and evolve technologies on their own.
The third purpose is to spread risk. Construction work always
contains high risks and uncertainties. Alliances are effective in sharing
risks among the members, so that each member will suffer fewer
uncertainties.
Finally, some Taiwanese construction firms enter alliances to
broaden their product or service offerings. Because of the increased
profitability in recent public construction projects, some companies in
Taiwan which used to focus on other market sectors in the construction
industry, also want to benefit from these public projects. They form
alliances with more experienced companies or foreign contractors in
order to obtain the know-how in different types of construction.
3.3.2 International Contractors
According to the survey of Engineering News Record in 1995,
among the top 225 international contractors, there are a total of 42
companies which are working in Taiwan. 20 Exhibit 3.7 shows where
20 "Going Global - The Top International Contractors," Engineering News Record. August 28, 1995. p.83-
96.
these 42 companies came from. The result of this survey indicates that
there are only 15 countries around the world in which there are more top
225 companies working than in Taiwan, which shows that Taiwan has
become one of the world's most important construction markets.
France Germany
National
UK
lity of Companies
Exhibit 3.7 International Contractors in Taiwan in 1995
Source: Engineering News Record
From the perspective of these international companies, forming
alliances may be a favorable strategic choice. The main purposes of these
companies in alliances are related to three aspects: market penetration,
capacity concern, and risk reduction.
US Others
--
~x~y"" `~~\`*- -- ---------`~
1. Foreign Market Penetration
When considering penetration into Taiwan's market, international
construction firms may form alliances for several reasons. First, alliances
may be mandated by the owner. In some bids of recent public projects in
Taiwan, the owners only allow firms to join the bidding in the form of
joint venture between at least one local firm and one foreign firm. To
comply with this requirement and receive profits from these projects,
foreign firms need to find local partners.
Second, alliances can solve the limitation of classification
regulation. The regulation requires all construction firms to start from
class C, including famous foreign companies who want to start their
business in Taiwan. Before they can upgrade to class A firms, which
takes at least four years, the jobs that they can take are limited in terms
of size and price, and therefore their profitability is limited. By forming
alliances with local firms, foreign companies at lower classes but with
enough qualification may have chances to earn more profit from larger
projects, which were beyond their reach according to the law. Also, the
working experience, an important factor for upgrading, is usually
measured in terms of the price of projects which have been done in
Taiwan. Foreign firms can gain experience credit with higher prices by
forming alliances with local firms, so that they can accelerate the
upgrade process.
Third, alliances are helpful for accessing local resources.
International construction companies usually need to find local sources
of machinery and labor. Without the help of local firms which are
familiar with the condition in the local supplier's market, foreign firms
may suffer serious cost disadvantage by not being able to find suppliers
with lower price or higher quality. Forming alliances with local firms
provides foreign companies at least the chance to contact the suppliers
which are doing business with their local partner.
2. Company Capacity Concern
International construction companies usually work in more than
one country. Although this provides them the chance to seek profit in a
broader range, because the resource and capacity of a company is
limited, spending too much in one market may result in scarcity in other
markets. Allying with others allows companies to preserve their
resources, and therefore choose profitable opportunities in a wider field
but at relatively less cost. With the capacity concern, foreign firms in
alliances wish to obtain the benefits of leveraging internal investments,
and reducing operating costs.
3. Risk Reduction
Getting into a foreign market is highly risky because of the
differences in culture, law, and other political conditions. Furthermore,
the resistance of local people toward foreigners may affect the
relationship with the owners or suppliers, which results in even higher
risk. Due to this unfamiliarity, foreign companies usually suffer higher
risk than domestic firms. Thus risk reduction is relatively more
important to foreign firms than local firms. Forming alliances allows
foreign firms to perform two risk-avoiding strategies. The first is to share
the risk of a project with local partners, who may have better knowledge
about what construction risks they may confront and how to deal with
them. The second strategy is risk diversification. Usually firms can
provide less company resources in alliances than if they take the projects
on their own. This allows them to spend the saved capacity in other
alliances. By doing this, foreign companies are actually diversifying their
risk from a single project to many projects.
3.4 Construction Alliances in Taiwan
The first construction alliance case is Taiwan Power Company's
dam construction project in 1969. After evaluating the technology level of
Taiwan's construction industry at that time, the owner found that no
Taiwanese company had the ability to finish the project. It thus invited
foreign contractors to bid this project. The alliance of Torno Co. (Italy)
and Kumagai Gumi Co. (Japan) won the bid and finished this project
successfully. 21
During 1970's, several alliances among domestic construction
companies had been formed for Ten Major Projects, Taiwan's first large
scale infrastructure construction program which started in 1973.
However, since the government did not promote alliances, there were
only a few alliance cases during 70-80's.
International construction alliances did not appear in Taiwan until
late 1980's, when the Taipei City Government started to work on its MRT
projects. The first international case was in 1989, and involved the
cooperation of a domestic construction company, Ret-Ser Engineering
Agency, and two foreign contractors, Samsung (Korea) and Ed. Ziblin
(Germany). After that, many foreign companies came to Taiwan, formed
alliances with local companies, and worked on projects in the Six-Year
National Development Program. These foreign companies include many
top global contractors such as Morrison Knudsen Corp. (US),
Bilfinger+Berger Bau AG (Germany), Shimizu Corp. (Japan), Obayashi
21 Lin, Ching-Nan. 1992. Research on the Joint Venture for Construction, Master Thesis, National Taiwan
Institute of Industrial Technology. p. 10. In Chinese.
Corp. (Japan), and Mitsui Construction Co. (Japan).2 2 In 1990's, most of
the major alliances in Taiwan involve international collaboration and
cooperation. Exhibit 3.8 shows the number of major construction
alliance cases in Taiwan.
Foreign-Local
Year Foreign-Foreign (International) Local-Local TotalAlliances AlliancesAlliances
Before 1970 1 1
1970- 1980 1 1
1980- 1990 1 3 4
1990 - 1995 2 16 3 21
Exhibit 3.8 Number of Major Construction Alliance Cases in Taiwan
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China
22 Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC. 1995. Operational Norms ofJV in Public Construction for Small &
Middle Size Entrepreneur. p.80-82. In Chinese.
IV. An Analysis of Profitability in International Alliances
4.1 The Overall Profit in a Construction Project
4.1.1 Types of Profits
Profit is the fundamental operational goal of a company. In order to
increase overall profits, companies have strong incentives to develop and
adopt different strategies. Even firms which sacrifice their short term
profits and focus on market share or position are basically promoting
their long term profits. Therefore, an understanding of the source of
profits is an essential issue in a firm's operation.
The overall profit of a construction firm from a specific project can
be divided into four categories: direct profits from construction, returns
on intangible assets, long term profits from other projects, and other
profits. 23 Each of the profit categories contains many different potential
profit items. Basically, profits in the first two categories come directly
from the specific construction project. Direct profits refer to the normal
returns on the firm's input of resources to the construction project.
Because these profits are actually the opportunity costs of company
resources, they will not vary dramatically from firm to firm.
The major factors which distinguish a firm's profits in a
construction project from those of other firms are intangible assets,
including exclusively owned construction technologies, better
management skills, useful past experiences, advantageous access to
construction resources, the ability to finance at a lower interest cost, and
special relationship with the owner. Profits obtained by the use of
intangible assets can be the most important part of the profits that a firm
23 Wu, Dao-Hseng. 1993. An Application of Game Theory in Contract Awarding Behaviors of Public
Construction Projects. Master Thesis, National Taiwan University. p33-35, 93-98. In Chinese.
derives from a project. A construction firm's returns on its intangible
assets are often the key factors in the probability of its being the winner
in the bidding for a construction project.
The third category, long term profits, measures the profits from
other construction projects, but the reasons for obtaining them are
generated from the current project. In fact, firms may be able to generate
many intangible assets from a current project, and thus long term profits
are often the returns on intangible assets of other projects. For example,
a construction company can apply the experience gained in the current
project and enjoy the resulting cost savings in later projects. In this case
these cost savings are the return on the firm's intangible assets of
experience when the profits of the later projects are considered. However,
if the firm wants to understand the profits from the current project, these
cost savings should be categorized as long term profits.
Construction firms may be able to obtain extra profits from
activities other than construction projects. These profits are grouped into
the last category as other profits. A construction firm's profits in this
category of do not come directly from construction projects, either
present or future. Rather, the project currently undertaken creates
opportunities for profits from land development, facility maintenance,
and actual operating the constructed facilities.
The timing of receipt of these profits is illustrated in Exhibit 4.1.
When considering the overall profits from a project, a construction firm
should estimate the expected values of the different profit items in these
four categories. The expected value of a profit item is based on two
factors: the possible amount of the profit, and the probability of
obtaining such an amount. By carefully assigning appropriate values to
the amounts and the probabilities for each profit item, a company can
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gain an insight into the overall profit it may obtain from a construction
project.
4.1.2 Competencies of a Construction Firm
Generally speaking, the ability of a construction firm to generate
more profits than other firms in a construction project comes mainly
from the three competencies: capital, intangible assets, and the access to
other profit opportunities. These competencies are the sources of a
construction firm's profits. The following examines these competencies
and the profit items brought by each of them.
1. Capital
Capital is essential to a construction firm's operation. Capital
affects profits from a project in two respects. First, the capital capacity
may be one of the qualifications for participating in a project in the first
place. As mentioned in 3.2.2, the pre-qualification bidding process used
in Taiwan usually requires firms to meet a certain capital capacity. In
this situation, capital decides whether a firm can undertake a certain
construction project, and thus decides whether the firm can earn any
profit from this project.
Second, a large amount of capital provides improved financial
ability. This ability may bring extra revenues which fall into the category
of direct profits from the current project. For example, the prices of
construction materials may fluctuate significantly during the long period
of construction. A firm with a large amount of capital may be able to
purchase all the materials it needs for the current project at one time
when the prices are low, and thus enjoy additional cost savings.
2. Intangible Assets
Intangible assets contribute a significant amount to a construction
firm's income from a project. In the construction industry, especially in
the public infrastructure construction market in Taiwan, the products
are undifferentiated. Following the process of design-then-construction,
and the low price bid system, different construction companies can
generate almost the same final product. Thus firms cannot make profits
from product differentiation. The only way to earn more profits than
other companies is to reduce costs as much as possible. Intangible
assets provide a construction company with the ability to reduce costs,
and therefore are very important factors in the firm's profitability. These
intangible assets can be divided into five major categories, including : 1.
technologies and skills, 2. advantageous access to resources, 3.
experiences, 4. special relationship with the owner, and 5. financial
credit.
The first category, technologies and skills, includes construction
technologies, technologies for management, management and scheduling
skills, and field construction techniques. This type of intangible asset
has three major effects on a company's profit. First, a specified standard
of technology is an essential requirement in Taiwan's pre-qualification
bidding system. Without meeting this standard, a company is unable to
enter the bidding. Second, experienced management skills and
technology can reduce costs involved in the construction process. Third,
firms with advanced technologies may be able to propose an alternative
construction method to the owner, and generate additional profits from
the cost differences between the alternative and the original methods
envisioned. These effects are not only related to the return on intangible
assets of the current project, but also are important to the long term
profits.
Advantageous access to resources mainly provides cost savings to
construction firms. In this category, three types of advantageous access
to resources are involved. First, firms may have long term working
relationships with specific suppliers, such as material suppliers,
subcontractors, and equipment rental companies. These relationships
enable firms not only to obtain construction resources at lower costs, but
also to retain a stable resource supply which is especially important
when many large projects are underway at the same time. This is the
situation in Taiwan's Six-Year National Development Plan. Second,
construction firms with vertical integration can enjoy cost savings on
resource supply. Possible forms of vertical integration may be include:
company ownership of important construction equipment; company
ownership of material factories; and work forces within the company that
can perform as subcontractors. Third, some companies may have the
unique sources of money from which they can borrow at a lower interest
rate. For example, some Taiwanese construction companies are in fact
subsidiaries of large financial institutions, which enable them to borrow
money at a much lower interest rate from their parent companies.
Experience falls into the third category of intangible assets. Past
experience affects a construction firm's profitability in two ways. First,
according to Taiwan's construction regulations, prior experience is not
only the key factor in classifying a firm, but also is the major
qualification for a firm to participate in a construction project. Firms
without sufficient experience have difficulty in being awarded projects,
and thus their overall profitability is influenced. Second, past experience
helps firms to reduce construction costs. This affects both the profits
from current project in terms of returns on intangible assets, and the
long term profits from other projects. Experience in previous projects is
helpful to the current project, while the experience obtained in the
current project may also help firms work at lower costs in their future
projects.
In the fourth category, if a firm has a special relationship with the
owner, the resulting stronger mutual trust between the firm and the
owner may benefit the firm in many ways. First, it may be easier for the
firm to negotiate with the owner over the contract items. Second, the
owner may apply more reasonable supervision during the construction
process so that the firm can avoid many problems which may cause the
delay of project completion. Third, the firm may be able to settle changed
conditions with the owner in a more favorable fashion. These effects may
help the firm obtain more profits from its current project.
Finally, good financial credit can help a firm to borrow more
money. Firms with better financial credit may be able to implement
better project financing. Thus this type of intangible asset can have a
similar effect as having a large amount of capital.
3. Access to other profit opportunities
Sometimes a project may give a firm the opportunity to obtain
more profits in addition to those generated on construction projects.
Some of these opportunities may be short term ones such as a rise in the
construction company's stock prices due to its being awarded the
project, or the opportunity to develop the land near the project site.
There may also be long term opportunities, such as additional revenues
from the maintenance of the constructed facility, or from the operation of
the facility.
4.2 Market Structure Analysis
Porter suggested a five forces framework to analyze the market
structure of an industry.24 These five forces are important because their
collective strength determines the potential of firms in a market. The
essence of strategy formulation is to cope with these five forces. These
forces include the threat of new entrants, rivalry among existing firms,
the bargaining power of buyers, the bargaining power of suppliers, and
the threat of substitute products or services. Exhibit 4.2 shows the
structure of this framework.
In order to understand how alliances affect the overall profit of
construction firms in Taiwan, this section applies the five forces
framework to see how alliances alter the strength of these forces, and
thus affect the profitability of a construction firm.
In the construction industry, the threat of substitutes is small. 25
Therefore this thesis will not discuss this market force. Moreover, in the
public infrastructure construction market, the buyer is the government.
It not only has the power of ordinary buyers in other industries, but also
has the power to affect a firm's profitability through its policy. Thus this
section also does not discuss the buyer's power. Detailed analysis of the
power of the government is presented in Chapter 5.
4.2.1 Threat of New Entrants
New entrants bring new capacity to the market. They try hard to gain
market share and often substantial resources, and thus reduce the
profitability of the existing firms. The strength of the threat from new
24 Porter, Michael E. 1985. Competitive Strategy. p.3-33.
25 Uemura, Daisuke. 1995. Strategies of Large Construction Firms in Japan for the Open Bidding Systems.
Master Thesis. MIT. p.62-63.
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entrants depends on the barriers to entry. There are seven major sources
of barriers to entry, including economies of scale, product differentiation,
capital requirements, switching costs, access to distribution channels,
cost disadvantages independent of scale, and government policy. Among
these sources, economies of scale in production is not applicable to the
construction industry.26 Products are undifferentiated because of the
build-after-design process in Taiwan's public infrastructure construction
market. Furthermore, since the low price bid system is in effect, all
qualified firms can participate in bidding, and the owner's switching
costs are low. Therefore, capital requirements, cost disadvantages
independent of scale, and government policy are major entry barriers to
Taiwan's public construction market.
Recently in Taiwan, the Six-Year National Development Plan has
resulted in many new construction projects. These profitable projects
have attracted many new entrants who are looking forward to entering
the public infrastructure construction market. There are three major
types of new entrants: international contractors; local class-A companies
which used to focus on other market sectors; and, other Taiwanese
construction firms in lower classes, especially class-B firms which are
more instantly threatening. The existing Taiwanese firms in that market
sector face a strong threat from these new entrants.
New entrants affect the expected profitability of existing
construction firms from a specific project in two ways. First, the increase
in the number of companies reduces the probability of winning any bid.
Second, new entrants are usually willing to enter a market at an initial
loss. Therefore, if existing firms want to compete, they have to reduce
their bidding prices. This increases the risk of projects, and thus reduces
the expected value of long term profits.
Alliances affect entry barriers, and in turn affect firms' profitability.
For foreign companies, they face two types of entry barriers: government
regulations; and cost disadvantages in accessing local construction
resources. Forming alliances with local companies is a favorable strategy
26 Uemura, Daisuke. 1995. Strategies of Large Construction Firms in Japan for the Open Bidding Systems.
Master Thesis. MIT. p.54.
for international firms to eliminate these barriers at lower costs in entry,
and thus enlarge their profitability in three aspects. First, direct profits
from the current project may increase due to saved entry costs. Second,
their returns on intangible assets from the current project may also
increase with local firms' favorable access to resources. Third, their long
term profits increase because they can establish a working record in
Taiwan more quickly, which is essential to their future qualification in
Taiwan's company classification system, and in the pre-qualification
bidding system.
On the other hand, however, for Taiwanese companies, by allying
themselves with foreign companies, they invite more firms into Taiwan's
construction market. Consequently, they intensify future competition in
the local market, reduce their own chances in winning future bids, and
thus their long term profits will decrease.
4.2.2 Rivalry among Existing Firms
One of the major considerations for a firm when it is setting its
strategy is the performance of existing competitors. The rivalry among
existing firms is strong in the construction industry for four reasons:
numerous competitors; slow industry growth; lack of produce
differentiation; and low switching costs of the owner. It is expected that
the future competition in Taiwan will be more severe after the finish of
the Six-Year National Development Plan, because the demand for
construction will largely decrease at that time, and many new firms enter
the market during the execution of the Six-Year National Development
Plan.
The key factor for winning competition in the construction industry
is profit items. Wu indicates that if a firm has more potential profit items,
it has a better chance to win the bid for a construction project.27 In order
to be a winner in bidding competition, a firm should try to obtain more
competencies to bring more possible profit items to this project.
Alliances may create synergy through combining competencies of
firms. This synergy increase firms' profits from the current project. An
international alliance is thus beneficent for firms' short term profits in
both categories of direct profits and returns on intangible assets, because
it contains a larger capital capacity contributed by partners; technology
advantages brought by the foreign firm; and the local firm's advantages
in accessing resources. By sharing risks between firms in an alliance,
each firm increases their own probability of obtaining profits from the
current project. However, alliances may not always be profitable in the
long run.
For local companies, forming alliances may help them acquire
advanced technologies, and increase their long term profits. On the other
hand, alliances give foreign companies access to local resources. This
may reduce the strength of local firms' advantageous access to resources,
and consequently reduce their long term profits. The situation for foreign
companies mirror that for local companies. While they can establish the
resource supply network with help from their local partners in alliances,
their loss of technologies reduce their strength of long term advantageous
competencies.
4.2.3 Bargaining Power of Suppliers
In the construction industry, there are three major types of
suppliers for construction resources: material sellers, equipment rental
27 Wu, Dao-Hseng. 1993. An Application of Game Theory in Contract Awarding Behaviors of Public
Construction Projects. Master Thesis, National Taiwan University. p.36-40. In Chinese.
companies, and subcontractors. 28 These suppliers can exert their
bargaining power and affect the profitability of an industry by
threatening to raise prices, reduce the quality of purchased goods or
services, and delay the delivery. The bargaining power of suppliers are
strong in the construction industry for several reasons. First, the
suppliers' products are important inputs to construction firms. No
construction company can work on any project without these suppliers.
Second, these suppliers face few threat from substitute products. Third,
construction companies will usually stick with some certain suppliers,
and thus the switching costs for them are large. This bargaining power is
even stronger in Taiwan recently because of the sudden demand
expansion in the beginning of the Six-Year National Development Plan.
The salary of laborers as well as engineers increased because of a
shortage of supply. Prices of many types of construction material also
increased.
The synergy resulting from alliances may help firms deal with the
bargaining power of suppliers. This has a positive contribution to firms'
profits from their current projects. For example, the larger capital
capacity from alliances may give firms the ability to purchase a larger
volume of materials at one time. This reduces the bargaining power of
material suppliers.
4.2.4 Summary of the Analysis
Exhibit 4.3 summarizes the result of market structure analysis
done previously. Firms can examine the effect of alliances on their
28 Uemura, Daisuke. 1995. Strategies of Large Construction Firms in Japan for the Open Bidding Systems.
Master Thesis. MIT. p.61.
expected profitability with this framework. This helps them understand
the possible profits or losses in alliances before they are formed.
(+) : increase profit (-) : reduce profit
Exhibit 4.3 Summary of Alliance Effects on Profit
4.3 Concept for Cooperation Decisions
4.3.1 Alliances and Competencies
Alliances change the strength of firms' competencies. This change
results in the effects on their profitability, as described in Section 4.2.
Among their three competencies described in Section 4.1.2, construction
firms will not lose their own capital capacity to each other in alliances.
Other profit opportunities can only affect a firm's profitability for the
current project. Moreover, these opportunities are under the control of
firms which own these opportunities. The exchange of profits from them
depends on the willingness of firms. However, firms may inevitably lose
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some of their advantages on intangible assets to the other party in
alliances.
The effects of alliances on a firm's profitability can be classified
into the following four categories, in terms of the relation with firms'
competencies.
1. Short Term Synergy from Competencies
Alliances generate synergy by combining competencies of firms.
This synergy affect mainly profits from the current project, and benefit all
parties in an alliance with no unfavorable effects. Several possible types
of synergy can happen in alliances, including: increased capital capacity;
combined advantages for the current project; better bargaining power to
deal with suppliers; and increased chances in other profit opportunities.
2. Gained Competencies for Long Term Profits
Firms may acquire competencies from their partners in alliances.
Gained competencies benefit only the firm which possess it. These
competencies usually have long term effects on firms' profitability. As
stated in 3.3, in construction alliances in Taiwan, one of the local firms'
objectives in construction alliances is to obtain technology from foreign
companies. For foreign contractors, on the other hand, they need the
access to resources from local companies.
3. Lost Competencies for Long Term Profits
This mirror the situation in gained competencies. For the party
which gives competencies, this is harmful because giving up
competencies implies the reduction of strength in its own competitive
advantages. Thus local firms may lose their advantage in accessing
resources, while foreign companies lose their advantage in technology.
4. Effects Independent of Firms' Competencies
Alliances may bring effects which are not related to firms'
competencies. There may be positive effects on firms' short term profits,
in that alliances help firms reduce their own risks in the current project.
There may also be negative effects. For example, alliances help foreign
firms enter the local market. For domestic companies, this increases
future competition, and will reduce their long term profitability.
In an international construction alliance formed by a local
company and a foreign contractor, as is the case in most of the alliances
in Taiwan, the local firm has the advantage in accessing resources, while
the foreign firm has the advantage in technology. Both parties want to
acquire the other's advantage, but they may lose their own in the
alliance. Their overall profit will also be affected by the synergy effects
generated from alliances, or effects independent of competencies in
alliances. Thus before firms decide to form alliances, they should
evaluate what overall effect the alliance has by following the profit
concept describe previously. If their overall profit increases, they may
benefit by forming alliances; however, if their profit decreases more from
losing advantageous competencies than it increases from acquiring the
other firm's competencies, not to form alliances may be a more profitable
strategic option.
4.3.2 Iso-Profit Curves
1. Local Firmnns
Local firms will give up their resource accessing advantages in
exchange for a foreign company's technology advantages. However, as
more resource accessing advantages have been given up, local firms are
less willing to give up even more since they want to maintain at least a
little advantage over their foreign counterpart. In addition, the marginal
profits brought by additional strength of technology advantage are
decreasing. Local firms are not willing to provide advantage in accessing
resource in exchange of technology if they already have sufficient
strength of technology advantage.
The concept of local firms' situation can be represented graphically
as iso-profit curves. The concept of iso-profit curve is similar to the
economic concept of isoquant, which is a curve that shows all possible
combinations of inputs that yield the same outputs. 29 These iso-profit
curves are convex toward the lower-right, as shown in Exhibit 4.4. In
this graph, the horizontal axis measures the strength of advantage in
accessing resources that local firms have, while the vertical axis
measures the strength of advantage in technology that foreign firms
provide. Each point in this graph represents the strength of advantage in
accessing resources that a local firm will give up, and the strength of
technology advantage that the firm can get in return. All points on a iso-
profit curve have the same level of profit, and each iso-profit curve
represents a different level of profit. For the same strength of resource
accessing advantage, the more strength of technology advantage provides
more profit. Therefore, the upper-left iso-profit curves represents higher
levels of profit. Firms will not give up any resource accessing advantage
29 Pindyck, Robert S. and Rubinfield, Daniel L. 1995. Microeconomics. 3rd Edition. p.168.
for nothing. Thus, when only the effects of competencies exchange are
under consideration, there is a least profit curve which pass through the
origin. The area to the left of the least profit curve is the feasible region,
which means local firms can only accept cooperation conditions in this
area.
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Exhibit 4.4 Iso-Profit Curves of a Local Firm
The least profit curve represents the cooperation conditions with
which the firm will receive the same amount of profit as if there is no
exchange between resource accessing advantage and technology
advantage. In the area to the right of this curve, the exchange conditions
Feasible
Region
Additional
Loss
can only make a firm worse off because the lose of advantage on resource
can lead to more severe future competition and the benefit from absorbed
technology cannot offset this lost.
If there are effects of synergy or potential disadvantages
independent of competencies in an alliance, the least profit curve may
not pass through the origin. These effects of an alliance provide
additional profits or losses other than competencies exchange. When
these effects provide a net additional profit, in order to obtain this profit,
a local firm may be willing to form an alliance and give up some of their
resource accessing advantages without asking for technology exchange.
This will shift the least profit curve to the right, and thus enlarge the
feasible region of the local firm. In this circumstance, the cooperation
can be achieved more easily. On the other hand, when the net effect is a
loss, the local firm may ask for technology without providing any
resource access in exchange, in order to offset the loss in the alliance.
Thus the least profit curve will move upward, and the feasible region of
the local firm will become smaller.
2. Foreign Firms
The situation for foreign firms can be analogous to the that of local
firms, as shown in Exhibit 4.5. Foreign firms have the iso-profit curves
with higher utility at the lower right part. Each point in this graph
represents the strength of technology advantage that the foreign firm will
give up, and the strength of advantage in accessing resources that it can
get in return. The curves are convex toward upper-left, and there is also
a least profit curve which confines the feasible region to the lower right
part. The net effect of synergy from an alliance and disadvantages
independent of competencies also shifts the least profit curve, as well as
shifting the feasible region. That is also because a foreign firm may give
up some technology advantages not for exchanging access to resources,
but for obtaining the net additional profit other than competencies
exchange from the current project, while it may also ask advantageous
access to resources without giving up technology in order to offset the
net additional loss other than competencies exchange in the alliance.
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Exhibit 4.5 Iso-Profit Curves of a Foreign Firm
4.3.3 Bargaining for Cooperation
1. Trade Region
By combining the iso-profit curves of local and foreign firms, one
can find that cooperation can be achieved in the region formed by the
least profit curves of local and foreign firms, as shown in Exhibit 4.6.
This region is called "trade region", in which cooperation can be achieved
because that is the intersection of the feasible regions of both parties.
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Exhibit 4.6 The Trade Region
Trade regions do not necessarily exist. Exhibit 4.7 demonstrates
two situations in which there is no trade region. In the first situation, the
-wpm
only intersection of two least profit curves is the origin, and there is no
trade region. This means that alliances cannot bring more profit to firms,
and thus cooperation cannot be achieved. This situation happens
because firms' least profit curves still pass through the origin, which is
resulting from firms' feeling that there is no additional profits from
alliances other than competencies exchange, or the additional profits was
offset by the potential loss independent of competencies. In these
circumstances, if firms determine that their own advantages are more
valuable than the other party's, the only intersection of least profit
curves is the origin.
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Exhibit 4.7 Situations of No Trade Region
In the second situation, there is no intersection of firms' feasible
regions. This happens because according to firms' evaluation, there are
very large potential losses independent of competencies in an alliance.
Thus there is also no cooperation.
Sometimes the trade region contains only one point, which is the
tangent point of two least profit curves, as shown in Exhibit 4.8. This
usually happens in the circumstance that there are net potential losses
for firms other than competencies exchange. In this case because the
only trade point is on firms' least profit curves, alliances will not increase
their profit. Therefore, firms are indifferent between whether or not to
form alliances.
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Exhibit 4.8 Single-Point Trade Region
2. Pareto Optimum
An alliance can make both participating firms better off with the
exchange condition at any point within the trade region. Thus
cooperation can happen at any point within the trade region. However,
only a few points in the trade region are the Pareto optima. A Pareto
optimum is a point that cannot be improved on.30 That is, in Pareto
optimum, the resources and output are allocated in such a way that no
reallocation can make anyone better off without making at least one
other person worse off.31
This situation can be demonstrated as Exhibit 4.9. An iso-profit
curve of local firm, PL1, and an iso-profit curve of foreign firm, PF1, have
two intersections, point A and C. Firms can choose two different degrees
of cooperation, either at high level point of A or at low level point of C,
and receive the same level of profit. However, neither point A nor point C
is a Pareto optimum because there is at least one party in this situation
that can be better off without making the other party worse off. For
example, firms can switch their exchange condition to point B, which is a
tangent point of PF1, and another iso-profit curve of the local firm, PL2.
From point A or C to point B, the foreign firm's profit remains at the
same level as PF1, but the local firm's profit increase from PL1 to a
higher level, PL2. Point B is a Pareto optimum because there is no way
that one firm can receive more profit without reducing that of the other.
3. Bargaining with Incomplete Information
Although firms have already been better off when they cooperate
with the condition at any point within the trade region, they will still
bargain for better cooperation conditions in order to achieve iso-profit
curves at higher profit levels since firms usually want to maximize their
own profit.
30 Binmore, Ken. 1993. Fun and Games. p.1 7 7.
31 Pearce, David W. 1992. The MIT Directory of Modern Economics. 4th Edition. p.324.
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Basically, when bargaining for the exchange conditions to form
alliances with, firms' information is incomplete in two ways. First, firms
are not sure about the profits they will obtain. They also do not know the
exact value of competencies which they acquire from alliances or lose in
alliances. Firms can deal with this problem only through better
estimating the expected values of profit items, as stated in Section 4.1.1.
Second, firms face incomplete information about the other party's
feasible region. According to the research done by many game theorists,
in the situation that bargainers have private information, there will be a
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great many equilibria in which bargainers can settle an agrpement. 32
Therefore, it is difficult to predict where in the trade region cooperation
will be achieved. However, when bargaining for alliance conditions, firms
should focus on two major issues in order to maximize their own profit.
First, they should make sure the cooperation condition is within the
trade region. As long as this condition holds, firms will benefit from
alliances. Second, during the bargaining process, firms should try to
achieve Pareto optimum. They may propose different exchange conditions
to see if there is any better condition that will make both firms in an
alliance better off.
32 Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean. 1991. Game Theory. p.399.
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V. Government Policy and Alliances
5.1 Promoting International Construction Alliances
5.1.1 Industrial Policy Failures in Taiwan
Taiwan had significant economic growth in the past forty years,
and the construction industry has played an important role in this
progress. However, the government did not adopt an appropriate
industrial policy for the construction industry. It invested in public
construction projects mainly for two purposes. First, public construction
projects were pursued to fulfill the need of domestic infrastructure. This
need was based on the rationale for supporting the expansion of other
industries, the demand from the public due to insufficient living
standards, and other political issues such as the reelection of mayors,
councilors, or parliamentarians. In these circumstances, the prime goal
of the government was to finish these projects as soon as possible in
order to satisfy the need and avoid complaint from the public.
Second, investment in construction projects is an important part of
fiscal policy in Taiwan. By increasing the investment in construction
projects, the government can increase the employment, and stimulate
demand in many other industries. Therefore, the Taiwanese government
often used the investment in public construction projects to boost
economic growth.
As a result of these two purposes, the government did not have a
long term plan for promoting the construction industry itself. Instead, it
used the construction industry as a tool to fulfill other goals. This
attitude caused many problems, as described in the following.
1. Flaws in contract awarding process
Three major flaws existed in the contracting process for public
construction projects in the past. First, the government gave the Retired
Serviceman Engineer Agency (RSEA) the priority to negotiation for public
construction projects. RSEA is a part of the government organization. It
was established mainly to help thousands of retired servicemen who
came to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang from mainland
China in 1949 when the communist China was established. RSEA
utilizes manpower of these veterans and performed construction work for
public projects. As a part of the government, it is believed that RSEA can
do the work at the lowest possible costs. There was also an executive
order from the Executive Yuan (Cabinet) which instructs the government
- both central and local- to negotiate with RSEA before proceeding with
open bidding for the public projects, especially projects which require
high levels of technology, in order to shorten the time of the bidding
process and construction. 33 This unfair bidding condition limited the
growth of private Taiwanese companies. As a result, when the Six-Year
National Program was about to start in 1991, RSEA was the largest
construction company in Taiwan, with the largest annual revenue and
over twenty times more employees than private Taiwanese construction
firms. 34
Second, the government applied "international bidding" to projects
which require high technology. In the "international bidding" process,
because of the concern that no domestic company has enough
technology to finish a project, only international contractors can
participate in the bidding process. For example, the first joint venture
33 Executive Yuan, ROC. Executive order. Retired Servicemen Assistant Act, Article 8.
34 "The Top 1000 Companies in Taiwan," Common Wealth Magazine. June 15, 1991. In Chinese.
case in Taiwan, a cooperation between Torno Co. (Italy) and Kumagai
Gumi Co. (Japan), was the result of international bidding. The
government usually finds international contractors for complex projects
in order to accelerate the progress of construction. Consequently, local
firms did not have a chance to work on these projects and develop
technology for them.
Third, the classification system does not require specialization.
Without being required to specialize in specific types of construction
work, Taiwanese construction firms did not spend money on R&D to
improve their specialization. This worsened the situation of the local
industry's lack of technology.
2. Inconsistent Investment in Public Construction
Because the government just wanted to fulfill short term demand
for construction, it did not have a long term plan for infrastructure
construction. Furthermore, the construction administration and
planning organizations in the government are complex and inefficient.
Consequently, investments in public infrastructure construction were
inconsistent. 35s The fluctuation in demand forced domestic construction
companies to remain small in order to have more flexibility in their
operation.
3. Inflexible Contracting Method
The government did not create profit incentive in its contracting
method for construction firms to reduce their costs on projects. Without
35 Chang, Chen-Yu. 1994. A Research on the Economic Behavior of the Construction Market in the R. O. C.
Master Thesis, National Taiwan University. p.194. In Chinese.
75
profit incentives, Taiwanese companies were more reluctant to develop
advanced technology or adopt better management skills for cost savings.
These problems not only resulted in the government suffering
higher cost and relative lower quality construction products, but also in
heavier impacts on the environment and society. Furthermore, the
domestic firms have remained small or medium in size, and their
technology ability has fallen far behind the big construction companies
from Japan, U.S. and Europe. According to a rough estimation, it will
take them about ten years to catch up.36 Thus, Taiwanese construction
companies face a crisis of surviving in the future.
5.1.2 Why should the Government Promote International Alliances
From the short term perspective, because of the past policy
failures, the construction industry in Taiwan does not have the capability
to absorb all the projects in the Six-Year National Development Plan. By
promoting alliances, the government can invite many international
contractors with large capital capacity and advanced technologies. This
accelerates the progress of these projects, and enables the government to
finish these projects at lower costs and enjoy higher quality. Moreover,
with foreign companies' better technology and experience, there may be
lower environmental and social impacts when the construction of these
projects is underway.
From the long term perspective, Taiwan has opened its
construction market to foreign companies. It can be expected that the
future competition in this market will be very severe. However, Taiwanese
36 Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC. 1995. Operational Norms ofJV in Public Construction for Small &
Middle Size Entrepreneur, p. 118. In Chinese.
construction firms do not have the ability to compete with foreign
companies. The construction industry is very important to a nation's
infrastructure. It will be disadvantageous for the government if this
industry is controlled by foreign companies. Therefore, the government
should help local firms establish their competitiveness for future
competition. Alliances provide local firms excellent access to advanced
technologies of foreign companies. Promoting international alliances may
help local firm obtain these technology more easily.
5.2 Market Power of the Government
5.2.1 The Power of Government Policy
Government can limit or even foreclose entry through controls
such as licensing requirements and limits on access to raw material.
This is the most powerful source of entry barriers because there is no
way to get around these regulations. The most significant example in
Taiwan's construction industry is the regulation about classification of
construction firms.
In order to eliminate this entry barrier, new entrants are willing to
pay higher costs in exchange for the resulting profits from entering the
market.
5.2.2 The Government as a Project Owner
Owners of construction projects have a primary goal to pay the
least price and enjoy the best quality product. In order to achieve this
goal, owners usually create a very competitive environment in order to
reduce the price. However, low price may result in low quality. Thus
there are lots of contracting mechanisms designed to provide the owners
as many chances as possible to choose the best combination of quality
and price. Even when those alternative contracting mechanisms are not
allowed to be used, owners can find the lowest price contractor and still
maintain acceptable quality through serious supervising.
The bargaining power of the government as the owner is strong in
Taiwan's situation because of several reasons. First, because the only
buyer of public projects is the government, this single buyer enjoys
monopoly power for setting prices. Second, the product of public
construction is undifferentiated in that public works usually have
standard specifications. Third, because the design of projects is usually
done by the owner, or agents who work for the owner, the owner has
clear information about the approximate cost of a project before its
bidding, and thus it is difficult for bidders to raise prices. Finally, saving
budget for construction projects is one of the key criteria in evaluating
the performance of a government's engineering agency. This evaluation is
very important to the promotion and career of officers who work in this
agency. Thus the government's engineering agencies will try hard to
make the bid prices as low as possible.
5.3 Policy Effects on Alliances
5.3.1 Policy and Alliance Decision
According to the concept of iso-profit curve, developed in Chapter
4, the effect of government policy on alliance decisions can be
demonstrated in Exhibit 5.1. If there is government policy which requires
local firms to ally with foreign firms in order to participate in bidding a
project, the least profit curve will move toward right. That is because
local firms now are willing to give up some of their advantages in
accessing resource in exchange not for technology, but for the profit
which they can obtain from the project which they are bidding for. The
feasible region of local firms will therefore expand to the right with the
policy constraint line. This effect is similar to the situation where there is
a net additional profit other than competencies exchange.
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Exhibit 5. 1 Cooperation with Government Policy
For foreign companies, the policy which requires foreign firms to
ally with local firms will also have a similar effect. It shifts a foreign firm's
least profit curve upward, as well as enlarges the firm's feasible region.
Strength of
Technology
Advantage
With the policy constraint, foreign firms will give up their technology
advantages for the profits they can receive from projects.
The government policy can therefore enlarge the trade region. The
cooperation can be achieved more easily with the policy constraint.
5.3.2 Policy Alternatives to Promote Alliances
Concluding from the previous analysis, if the government wants to
promote alliances, the best way is to enlarge the feasible region of firms,
which in turn enlarges the trade region.
There are two possible policy alternatives which can enlarge firms'
feasible region. First, the government can force firms to form alliances.
As described in the previous section, with this policy constraint, firms
need to form alliances and give up some of their competencies
advantages in order to obtain the profit from a project.
The other policy alternative that the government can adopt to
expand firms' feasible regions is to increase the profit other than
competencies exchange in alliances. Although one of the government's
primary goal in a bidding process is to save as much project budget as
possible, which reduces firms' direct profit from a project, the
government can still increase other profit items. For example, the
government can grant firms in alliances more opportunities for land
development. This additional profit received from land development can
be obtained only by firms which form alliances, and thus it increases the
benefit effect of alliances, as shown in Exhibit 5.2. Firms' feasible region
will become larger because of this addition profit, and firms will have a
better chance to achieve cooperation.
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Exhibit 5.2 Effects of Additional Profit in Alliances
.00 -
VI. Conclusions & Recommendations
6.1 Conclusions
As Porter indicated, although alliances can help firms achieve
selective benefits, they always exact significant costs.3 7 Since firms'
primary operational goal is to increase their overall profits - including
both short term and long term, firms should understand how alliances
will change their overall profits in the first place. They should never
accept alliance proposals which result in overall loss in their profitability.
This thesis provides a method to analyze the overall profits in an
international construction alliance. A construction firm should first
identify the profit items that it can obtain from a project which it is going
to bid for, and assign appropriate expected values to each profit item. By
applying the five forces framework, the firm can then investigate the
effects of an alliance which will change the overall profit from the project.
Finally, when it is bargaining with its partner to establish the
cooperation condition, it should make sure that the condition is in its
feasible region in terms of competencies exchange, and with respect to
achieving Pareto optimum.
The government plays an important role in shaping the
development of the construction industry. It also has strong power in
promoting construction alliances. In order to cure its past flaws in policy,
the Taiwanese government should attempt to promote international
alliances in the construction industry through two policy alternatives:
one setting regulation to enforce alliances; and the other enlarging profits
from alliances, as described in Chapter 5.
37 Porter, Michael E. 1990. "The Competitive Advantage of Nations," Harvard Business Review. March-
April 1990. p.92.
The discussion in this thesis mainly focused on decisions before
firms form alliances from a profit perspective. However, this is not to say
that management in alliances is not important. Even when firms made
right decisions, if they don't apply appropriate management to manage
alliances, they may not be able to receive expected benefits, and the
realized cooperation condition may fall outside their feasible region.
Several key factors for managing a successful alliances were described in
Section 2.1. Firms should adopt these principles to ensure their profits
from alliances.
6.2 Recommendations for Construction Firms
6.2.1 Taiwanese Construction Companies
Facing the urgent problem of lacking competitiveness, the most
important goal that Taiwanese companies should seek in international
alliances is to acquire technology, rather than to obtain profits from the
current projects. Since domestic firms have a better chance to seek other
profits outside projects, Taiwanese firms may attempt to obtain such
profit opportunities as often as possible, share them with foreign firms to
enlarge their feasible region, and acquire technology through alliances.
In the long run, Taiwan has only a relatively small construction
market. In addition, Taiwan's market has opened to foreign companies,
so that the competition in the future may be very severe. After gaining
sufficient competitiveness in size and technology, Taiwanese construction
companies should go aboard to seek more opportunities and in order to
maintain their profitability. They may try to enter the market in
developing countries, especially in mainland China. China has a large
market and strong demand in infrastructure construction. Moreover, in
comparison with other international contractors, Taiwanese companies
have advantages in many aspects (such as language) in China. Taiwan
has improved its economy through investment in China and was the
second highest foreign capital investor in China in 1994.38 Taiwanese
companies may aim at China as their first target market for their
globalization.
6.2.2 International Contractors
In order to seek as many profit opportunities as possible,
international contractors should broaden their market and work in a
wide range of countries. However, they always face high difficulty when
they want to enter a new market. While they can fulfill their purposes in
the three aspects of market penetration, company capacity concern, and
risk reduction through forming alliances with domestic companies, they
should also understand the competencies which they will lose in
alliances, and the resulting reduction in their overall profits. If the losses
exceed the benefits from alliances, they should wait for another entry
opportunity, or choose alternatives other than alliances to enter the
market.
6.3 Policy Recommendation for the Government
Promoting international alliances is a favorable policy for the
government, as described in Section 5.1.2. When the Taiwanese
government applies policy tools for promoting international construction
alliances, they should also ensure the effectiveness of technology transfer
to the local companies.
38 Baltierra, Miguel. 1994. "Looking to the Mainland for Future Growth," Architectural Record, July 1994.
In addition to promoting international alliances, the Taiwanese
government should also consider the following four policies in order to
help local construction companies establish their competitiveness.
1. Promote Local Alliances
By forming alliances, local construction firms can combine their
capacity to finish large projects. Furthermore, firms can work together in
alliances to develop advanced technology.
2. Steady Investment
The fluctuation in demand forced domestic construction
companies to remain small, as described in Section 5.1.1. Therefore, the
government should have a long term plan for its investment in
infrastructure construction, and invest more steadily on public
construction projects.
3. Regulation on Specialization
By requiring firms to specialize in specific types of construction
work, the government can increase the competition in each
specialization. As a result, construction firms will pay more efforts on
developing new technology in order to increase their own
competitiveness.
4. Apply Other Contracting Methods
Some of the contracting methods other than low-price bidding can
create incentives for construction firms to reduce their costs on projects
or improve quality. With these incentives, Taiwanese construction firms
will be more willing to develop advanced technology or adopt better
management skills.
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